

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

CIA 36010

COPY NO. 16

30 November 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR: STANDING COMMITTEE MEMBERS OF THE IAC

SUBJECT: Crisis Situations

REFERENCES: (a) Circular memorandum to Standing Committee dated 28 October 1949 enclosing the Army's Proposal for an amendment to NSCID 1.

(b) Circular memorandum to Standing Committee dated 10 November 1949 enclosing draft of proposed DCI Directive.

ENCLOSURE: (A) Proposed DCI 3/-, 30 November 1949 (Revised)

1. At the request of the Air Force and Army members of the Standing Committee, there will be a meeting to discuss the above mentioned proposals on the above subject at 2:00 p.m. on Monday, 12 December 1949, in the Ground Floor Conference Room of the Administration Building at 2430 E Street, N. W. We should also like to discuss the enclosed November 30th revision of the November 10th draft which incorporates some of the suggestions received to date from some members of the Standing Committee.


2. It is understood that the Army wishes to have approved its original proposal. However, most of the members of the Standing Committee are in favor of the second proposal.

3. The method of handling intelligence estimates on crisis situations is an extension of NSCID 3 and DCI 3/1, and nothing in this regard need be added to NSCID 1, since paragraph 4 covers the general subject of production. Furthermore, NSCID 1, paragraph 3 (c), gives adequate weight and authority to the DCI directives.

4. The Army proposal in effect says (erroneously) that the Intelligence Advisory Committee should be collectively responsible for estimates in crisis situations in collaboration with the Director of Central Intelligence. Collective Intelligence Advisory Committee responsibility for CIA estimates can result only in the lowest common denominator in each instance. The doctrine of collective responsibility has been rejected by the National Security Council in connection with the comments on the Dulles Report in NSC 50. By directive of the National Security Council, the concurrences of the Intelligence Advisory Committee departments and agencies must be noted in CIA national estimates, or such estimates must include statements of substantial disagreement. This appears to us as an individual departmental responsibility, and not a collective Intelligence Advisory Committee responsibility.

5. When members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee receive information of a critical nature, their only immediate responsibility to CIA is to see that it is forwarded immediately to the Director of Central Intelligence. At this juncture, there would be no necessity to convene a meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Committee for the Committee to "evaluate" the information. The Director, however, would wish to talk over with the Intelligence Advisory Committee members any such critical information before finalizing an estimate to get their views on the subject (agreement or disagreement), and he would like to do this as expeditiously as possible. By law, however, the national intelligence estimate must be prepared by CIA, not by the Intelligence Advisory Committee.

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PRESCOTT CHILDS, Chief,
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and Policy Staff

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